Privacy leaks from Netflix videos/movies are well researched. Current state-of-the-art works have been able to obtain coarse-grained information such as the genre and the title of videos by passive observation of encrypted traffic. However, leakage of fine-grained information from encrypted video traffic has not been studied so far. Such information can be used to build behavioral profiles of viewers.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, Netflix released the first mainstream interactive movie called Black Mirror: Bandersnatch, which is the most popular among the six interactive movies on Netflix [1] . In this movie, viewers are allowed to create their own story-line by choosing one of the on-screen options (e.g., an option to throw tea over the computer or to shout at Dad) presented to them. Depending on the viewer's choice, the corresponding segment of the movie gets played. Interestingly, the choices made and the path followed can potentially reveal viewer information that ranges from benign (e.g., their food and music preferences) to sensitive (e.g., their affinity to violence and political inclination). Although this information is available to Netflix, they are bound by legal clauses that prevent them from misusing it. Today, to prevent this information from leaking to unauthorized parties, Netflix uses end-to-end encryption. Recent works [4, 5] in the domain of encrypted network traffic analysis were able to infer information such as the title of videos watched by a viewer. In this work, we raise the following research question: 'Do interactive movies leak fine-grained information about the viewers to passive eavesdroppers (compromised network devices) even when encrypted?'.
Contributions. (1)
We present the first traffic analysis technique for interactive videos that can leak more information than noninteractive videos. (2) We present the first dataset and identify future directions for encrypted traffic analysis on interactive videos.
RELATED WORK
The objectives of existing research works [3] [4] [5] have so far been limited to discerning video content, identifying the titles of videos, Table 1 : Attributes of the dataset and the genre preferred by a viewer from encrypted traffic of conventional videos.
Existing techniques from the literature are not suitable for encrypted interactive video traffic analysis due to the following fundamental reason: inter-video features cannot be used to differentiate between segments from the same video. For instance, prior works [4] have used bitrate as a feature to differentiate between two video streams. However, in the context of an interactive video, the bitrate of chunks pertaining to each choice will be the same and hence cannot be used to distinguish between two video segments. In this work, we identify an intra-video side-channel and show that it holds across various operating conditions.
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
In this section, we first describe the streaming process of interactive Netflix videos. Due to the non-linearity of the script, the streaming process is check-pointed at each choice-question in the movie unlike conventional videos that stream continuously. The content of interactive videos is divided into several segments, each corresponding to one path segment in the script, with each segment consisting of multiple video chunks. Figure 1 shows an example of the control and data traffic exchanged when a viewer makes choices. The first segment of the movie (i.e., Segment 0) is common for all viewers at the end of which the choice-question Q1 is presented. At this point, the viewer's browser sends a JSON file (type-1 JSON file) to the server indicating that the viewer has encountered Q1. The viewers are then given ten seconds to choose one of the options. Our experiments revealed that Netflix considers one choice to be the default and prefetches video chunks corresponding to this choice. We denote the default choice for question Qi as Si and the non-default choice as Si ′ . If the viewer chooses Si, then the streaming continues uninterrupted. However, if the choice Si ′ is chosen, the prefetching for Si stops and a request for Si ′ is sent.
In the example, the viewer selects the default choice S1 for Q1. The streaming continues uninterrupted until Q2 appears. Like before, a type-1 JSON file is sent from the viewer to Netflix. We assume that the viewer selects S2 ′ for Q2. In this case, a type-2 JSON file will be sent subsequently. Although some chunks corresponding to S2 are pre-fetched, they will be discarded and the chunks corresponding to S2 ′ will be streamed. Therefore, we can conclude that the number and type of JSON files sent indicate the choice made by the viewer. However, identifying the two types of JSON files from encrypted network traffic is challenging.
Our analysis revealed that the packets carrying the encrypted type-1 and type-2 JSON files can be distinguished from other packets by their SSL record lengths. This observation was found to be consistent across various operating systems, browsers, devices, connection media, network conditions, and for all interactive movies released so far. Hence, we use 'SSL record lengths of client packets' as the side-channel. The JSON file types can be used to infer if the choice is the default or the non-default one. The actual on-screen choices can be inferred by re-creating the sequence.
RESULTS AND DATASET
We conducted our experiments on all the six interactive videos released by Netflix. Due to space constraints, we present the results for 'Black Mirror: Bandersnatch' but our results were consistent across all movies. For evaluation, we collected the encrypted network traces corresponding to viewing sessions of 100 viewers. The network traces were collected from the nearest gateway. The ground truth for evaluation was generated by asking the viewers to note down the choices they made. The viewers were free to choose the device, operating system, browser, and the geographic location from which they could watch the movie. We also collected some behavioral parameters of the viewers to highlight the implications of this privacy leak. Table 1 summarizes the behavioral and operational conditions. We have released our dataset to interested researchers [2] . Figure 2 shows the SSL record lengths of packets carrying type-1 JSON, type-2 JSON, and other traffic. Note that the two JSON files have distinctive record lengths most of the time (96%), based on which the viewer choices can be inferred.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we show the first side-channel attack on interactive videos and release a dataset for other researchers.
Countermeasures. An easy fix for the problem would be to either split the JSON file or to compress it so that it becomes indistinguishable. However, there could be timing side-channels that may still exist even after this fix. Despite disclosing this vulnerability to Netflix several months beforehand, it has not been fixed perhaps due to performance reasons. Advancing privacy research. The video streaming engine used by Netflix is proprietary and hence we could not implement and evaluate our countermeasures. Practical implementation of even simple countermeasures may require significant changes to the software and may result in overheads and poor viewing experience. Further, these countermeasures may in-turn expose stronger unobvious side-channels. To implement and evaluate countermeasures, there is a need for an open source model of the interactive video control packet exchange, which we plan to develop in a future work.
